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Pricing and Market Segmentation Using Opaque Selling
Mechanisms
Chris K. Anderson and Xiaoqing Xie
School of Hotel Administration, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
cka9@cornell.edu
In opaque pricing certain characteristics of the product or service are hidden from the
consumer until after purchase, transforming a dierentiated good into somewhat of a com-
modity. Opaque pricing has become popular in service pricing as it allows rms to sell their
dierentiated products at higher prices to regular brand loyal customers while simultaneously
selling to non loyal customers at discounted prices. We develop a stylized model of consumer
choice that illustrates the role of opaque pricing in market segmentation. We model a mo-
nopolist selling a product via three selling channels: a regular full information channel, an
opaque posted price channel and an opaque bidding channel where consumers specify the
price they are willing to pay. We illustrate the segmentation created by opaque pricing as
well as compare optimal revenues and prices for sellers using regular full information chan-
nels with those using opaque selling mechanisms in conjunction with regular channels. We
also study the segmentation and policy changes induced by capacity constraints.
Keywords: Revenue Management, Marketing:Pricing, Segmentation, Auctions, Buyer
behavior
1. Online Travel Sales
The pricing of services (rooms, rental cars, airline seats, etc...) online has dramatically
changed how service rms reach customers, with online travel sales now exceeding oine
(or traditional sales channels). Initial thoughts about pricing online were very positive as
rms had new channels to reach customers enabling increased opportunities for segmentation.
Over time service providers have increased eorts to move customers back to company direct
distribution channels (company websites and call centers) in an eort to control sales costs
and commissions while maintaining direct contact with the customer to facilitate loyalty
programs and other marketing eorts.
Hotwire and Priceline, unlike other online travel sales channels such as Expedia, Traveloc-
ity and Orbitz, oer customers opaque products with aspects of the service provider concealed
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until the transaction has been completed. Figure 1 shows a typical service provider listing
(here hotels) on a full information channel like Expedia. Figures 2 and 3 display information
available to someone using Hotwire's opaque mechanism. For instance a customer purchas-
ing a hotel room through Hotwire can not specify the hotel they wish to stay at, but rather
only its star rating and general location within the destination city. Customers do not know
the identity or exact location of their non-refundable choice property until after purchase.
Opaque travel sites oer service providers a convenient channel to segment customers and
distribute discounted products without cannibalizing or diluting full priced products. The
opaque channels naturally segment customers as regular full price paying customers desiring
to stay at the hotel of their choice with full cancellation exibility are unique from those
willing to purchase the discounted, non-refundable opaque product at the unknown service
provider. Similar to the opaque posted price model of Hotwire, Priceline oers opaque ser-
vices but without posted prices. Priceline's name-your-own-price model is similar to Hotwire
where consumers, as shown in Figure 4, only know the star level and region for a hotel. On
Priceline, consumers post bids for the opaque service as shown in Figure 5, having to then
wait for the service provider to accept to reject their oer. For a more detailed description
of Priceline's name-your-own-price model see Anderson (2009). While the illustrations pro-
vided in Figures 1-5 use hotels as examples, opaque services are also oered for other travel
services. With air travel, the consumer is unaware of the itinerary (connections and layover
durations) or airline and with rental cars, the consumer does not know the type of car or
rental rm until after paying for the service. Lastminute.com, another online travel agent,
also oers opaque posted price services similar to those of Hotwire.
The level of opacity varies across the dierent opaque channels as some choose to oer
cancelation opportunities as in the case of Lastminute.com, provide user generated feedback
as in the case of Hotwire.com, or list some of the amenities oered by the service provider.
Similarly the degree of opacity may also be impacted by the market, as markets with fewer
similar competitors oer decreased opacity over markets with a larger number of service
providers.
Opaque selling has recently started to receive interest in the the academic literature,
most of the early research has focused on models similar to Priceline's name-your-own-price
(NYOP) bidding mechanism where customers post bids for opaque services. Anderson (2009)
provides a detailed background on the nature of Priceline's NYOP model as well as a dynamic
programming based model for the setting of prices by rms on Priceline. Fay (2004) develops
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Figure 1: Typical Full Information Hotel Listing
Figure 2: Posted Opaque Hotel Listing
a stylized model of a monopolist rm using a NYOP channel and investigates whether
repeat bidding should be allowed. Strictly speaking, Priceline does not allow repeat bidding
within a 24 hour period but there are numerous methods to circumvent this limitation, see
BiddingforTravel.com for examples. Fay indicates that partial repeat bidding, i.e. repeat
bidding by knowledgable customers may be less protable than complete repeat bidding.
Fay (2008) extends the monopolist model to a duopoly model with rms pricing into two
consumer segments. One segment is loyal to a particular service provider, the second has
preferences distributed between the two rms along a line as in the traditional Hotelling
model (Hotelling, 1929). Fay (2008) is the rst paper to investigate how product opacity
aects the market. Fay studies two competing service providers selling products to two types
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Figure 3: Posted Opaque City Areas
Figure 4: Opaque Bidding Hotel Listing
Figure 5: Submitting Opaque Bid
4
of customers (business and leisure) on both an opaque posted price channel and a traditional
distribution channel. Fay shows that opaque selling benets the monopoly service provider
when customers have heterogenous values for products. Shapiro and Shi (2008) extend the
model of Fay (2008) to N rms with the number of rms indicating the degree of opacity
- uncertainty in knowledge of service provider increases with number of rms. Shapiro and
Shi focus on providing a rationale for opaque selling. They explain why service providers
are willing to distribute products through opaque travel sites such as Priceline and Hotwire
and lose the advantage of product dierentiation.
Hann and Terwiesch (2003) use data from a European NYOP retailer to investigate con-
sumer transactions costs (the cost of resubmitting bids) of using a repeat bidding NYOP
channel. In a related paper Spann et al. (2004) investigate consumers' frictional or trans-
actions costs as well as their willingness to pay using data from a German NYOP seller of
ights from Germany to Spain.
Wang et al.(2009) develop a game theoretic model of a supplier using both regular posted
price full information channels as well as a NYOP channel to reach heterogeneous customers.
They develop a two-stage game where suppliers set posted prices in period 1 and after
observing demand in period 1, set minimally acceptable prices at the NYOP channel in
period 2. Posted prices are rigid in period 2. Consumers observe posted prices in the
rst period then decide to buy or bid in period 2. The rigidity of posted prices combined
with demand uncertainty results in the NYOP channel generating improved revenues for
the service provider. Wilson and Zhang (2008) look at a retailer setting prices on a NYOP
channel. They develop  optimal policies for the retailer that encourage the customer to bid
their maximum reservation price.
Related research looks more generally at opaque selling where prices are posted but some
aspect of the service or service provider is hidden i.e. the selling mechanism similar to
that provided by Hotwire.com. Jiang (2007) develops a Hotelling type model to illustrate
how a rm should price on regular full information channels versus opaque channels. Jiang
indicates that opaque selling can be Pareto improving for both customers and suppliers
when customers are dierentiated in their willingness to pay. Jiang compares opaque selling
and regular selling (selling full-information products), providing insight when to implement
opaque selling. Jerath, Netessine and Veeraraghavan (2007) compare opaque selling with
last-minute direct selling and obtain the conditions under which opaque selling is preferred.
In their model two rms of equal capacity oer a dierentiated service via three channels:
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regular posted price, posted last-minute sales, and last-minute sales through an opaque
intermediary. Their goal is to investigate under what market conditions a rm should directly
oer last-minute discounts versus oer those discounts through an intermediary. Jerath et al.
relax the posted price rigidity of Wang et al. (2005) through introduction of the direct last-
minute discounts. They conclude that direct last-minute selling is preferred over the opaque
intermediary when consumer valuations are high or if the service oerings are relatively
homogeneous.
While there is an extensive body of research on the use of auctions, very little of this
research looks at the simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices. Firms can use auctions
to reach customers whom may not otherwise purchase, as posted prices may be too high.
Conversely auctions potentially dilute revenues as customers willing to pay posted (full
prices) may purchase (at lower prices) via the auction. The opaque nature of Priceline's
NYOP model helps to avoid this dilution. Etizon, Pinker and Seidmann (2006) is one of the
few auction related papers that looks at the simultaneous use of auctions and posted prices.
Similar to our development they look at a rm with excess supply facing consumers who
strategically choose to purchase at posted prices or bid (resorting to posted prices if their bid
fails). Dierent from our model, consumers do not face any product opacity with the auction
but do incur a waiting cost associated with bidding. Van Ryzin and Vulcano (2004) look at
rm using posted prices as well as an auction mechanism, unlike our model of endogenous
channel choice (strategic customers similar to Etizon et al.) they assume separate streams
of customers to each channel with the seller deciding on inventory allocation across the
channels.
We develop a stylized model of consumers looking to acquire travel services through either
full information or opaque channels (both posted price and bidding). Consumers choose their
channel or sequence of channels (in the case of bidding rst followed by posted prices) that
maximizes their surplus. Our paper is unique from the literature in that it is the only paper
that investigates a rm using two opaque (posted and bidding) channels simultaneously with
regular full information posted price channels. Second, prior research assumes two or more
exogenous customer segments (i.e. business and leisure) with the opaque channels targeted
at the leisure or price sensitive segment; whereas we develop endogenous consumer segments
where consumers choose the channel of their choice by maximizing their surplus. Our goal is
to illustrate how opaque channels naturally segment consumers as well as how rms should
use and price into these channels as a function of the degree of their opacity. We also discuss
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the segmentation and policy changes changes induced by capacity constraints.
2. Model Development
We develop a model of a rm selling to strategic consumers - consumers are strategic as they
choose the channel or sequence of channels which maximizes their surplus. The seller can
potentially oer its products across three selling mechanisms: a posted full information mar-
ket, posted opaque market with certain aspects of the product hidden and a name your price
opaque auction mechanism. Unlike previous research which assumes exogenous consumer
behavior we model endogenous consumer behavior where all consumers act strategically as
they optimally choose the channel (or sequence of channels) that maximizes their surplus.
For ease of exposition we will refer to the full information channel as the regular (REG), the
opaque posted price channel as opaque (OPQ) and the opaque channel with bidding as BID.
For comparison purposes, think of our regular channel as a rm's website (Marriott.com,
Hilton.com or USAirways.com) or a typical online travel agent similar to Expedia, Orb-
itz or Travelocity, the posted opaque channel analogous to Hotwire.com, and our bidding
model similar to Priceline's name-your-own-price model. We do not model competition in
the full information market as the rm is selling a dierentiated/branded product desired
by consumers.
Each customer i looking to acquire service has an independent reference price or valuation
vi for the service provider. Similar to Wang et al. (2009) we assume vi uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1, i.e. its density function f(vi) is 1 for 0  vi  1 and 0 otherwise. The
service provider posts a price P1 on the regular channel and fully discloses all service provider
characteristics. The service provider posts price P2 on the opaque posted price channel and
reveals the full information until after the purchase. The service provider also sets a threshold
price R on the opaque biding channel. The customer, if they choose to bid, bids Bi on the
bidding channel. Similar to Hann and Terwiesch (2003), Spann et al. (2004) and Ding et
al. (2005), with limited knowledge of the value of the threshold R, customers expect R to
be distributed uniformly over [0; 1]. As a result customers believe their bid of B will be
accepted by the service provider with a probability of B.
When a consumers pays P1 at the regular full information channel they are purchasing the
product from the service provider of choice, here assuming the consumer has an anity for
this branded service provider. When the consumer pays P2 at a posted opaque channel they
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know they are receiving a similar product but they don't know from which service provider
- e.g. could be any of 10 3-Star hotels in Times Square NYC. Typically posted price opaque
channels like Hotwire.com display online the service provider whom has provided them the
lowest price - e.g. if all 10 of the aforementioned 3-Star Times Square hotels oered inventory
to Hotwire only the one with the cheapest price would be posted with the opportunity for a
sale. Which property is displayed would change over time as transactions occur and inventory
is sold. Priceline's opaque bidding channel behaves in a similar fashion except the consumer
submits an oer, Bi, for a 3-Star Times Square hotel, Priceline then randomly selects from
the rms that have provided it with inventory to see if they have a price that is less than the
consumers oer price. Priceline randomly rotates through all the qualifying hotels (3-Star
Times Square) until either a hotel with a price low enough is found or no service provider
meets the consumer's bid. Online boards such as BiddingForTravel.com provide resources
and historic bid results to help consumers in determining how to bid on Priceline. For a
more exhaustive discussion of Priceline see Anderson (2009).
The service provider looks to augment its full information channel with the opaque chan-
nels in an eort to sell surplus inventory. The service provider looks to use the opaque
channels even though they yield considerately lower revenues (typical discounts at Hotwire
and Priceline range from 25-50%). Figure 6 shows a set of sample reservations buildup for a
3.5 star hotel in Dupont Circle Washington DC. The gure shows the average percentage of
reservations over the last week prior to arrival for 6 weeks of arrival dates in the fall of 2008.
The gure displays total reservations as well as those through each of Hotwire and Priceline.
As can be seen from the gure Hotwire and Priceline are typically only used very close to
the arrival day. Virtually no reservations are accepted on opaque channels prior to 7 days
before arrival whereas approximately half of total reservations have been received prior to
the last week. The service provider is using the deeply discounted opaque channels to sell
distressed inventory, inventory that would otherwise not be sold, over these nal few days
prior to arrival. During these last few days prior to the service becoming worthless (hotel
bed not occupied or airline seat ying empty) the rm is in essence pricing without capacity
considerations (able to meet all demand). Whereas earlier on in the selling process (several
weeks or months prior to arrival at the hotel or departure of the aircraft) the rm may not
use opaque channels as it prices in consideration of capacity constraints - hoping to sell all
inventory at higher prices to the brand loyal customers on the full information channels. As
we will also see in later sections, the rm also tends not to use the opaque channels if they
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are not very opaque. The opaque channels become increasingly less opaque earlier on in the
selling process as fewer rms may tend to use them - with opacity as in Shapiro and Shi
(2008) directly related to the number of service providers using the opaque channels.
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Figure 6: Reservations buildup at Hotwire, Priceline and all channels for 3.5 star DC hotel
In the following sections we outline optimal prices and the resulting market segmentation
for a service provider who has the opportunity to release their products on the regular full
information channel, an opaque posted price channel and an opaque channel with bidding.
We illustrate our modeling approach when the service provider chooses to list only on the full
information channel, optimal prices and the resulting revenue provide a basis to later compare
multi-channel strategies. Initially we focus on a rm with no capacity constraint, later
extending the formulation to a rm where demand exceeds capacity. For ease of presentation,
and without loss of generality, all revenues are normalized to a market of one.
2.1 Customer Segmentation
The service provider chooses to release products only on the REG and set its price as P1.
Consumer i has surplus CSi = vi   P1, so only consumers with valuation higher than the
price P1 will purchase on this channel(Table 1 summarizes all model notation).
Therefore, the expected revenue for the service provider  is given by
 =
Z 1
P1
P1f(vi)dvi = P1(1  P1) = P1   P 21 (1)
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Table 1: Notations in the model
vi consumer i's valuation of the product
P1 price set by the service provider on the REG channel
P2 price set by the service provider on the OPQ channel
R biding threshold set by the service provider on the BID channel
d1 the discount factor for purchasing on OPQ
d2 the discount factor for biding on BID
Bi1(vi) the bid of consumer i in the segment of BID then REG market segment
Bi2(vi) the bid of consumer i in the segment of BID then OPQ market segment
Bi3(vi) the bid of consumer i in the segment of BID only market segment
V1; V2; V4 the critical value points in the market segmentation
V3; V5; V6 the critical value points in the revenue segmentation
C the capacity constraint
Taking the derivative of  with respect to P1 and setting it to be zero, we can solve for the
optimal price should be posted on REG: P 1 = 1=2.
Since d
2
dP1
2 =  2 < 0, we substituteP 1 back into (1) and get the maximum revenue  = 14 :
Moreover, from (1), it is straightforward to see that the maximum revenue is concave in the
prices. Figure 7 summarizes the segmentation created by only pricing on the REG.
sP 10 1
 -A
P 1 =
1
2
A - customers purchasing
Figure 7: Segmentation resulting from full information posted prices
The service provider now release products on the REG, OPQ and BID simultaneously.
They set price P1 on REG, P2 on OPQ, a biding threshold i.e. the minimum acceptable
bid R on BID, which is unknown to the consumers. However, as mentioned previously that
consumers expect R to follow a uniform distribution over [0; 1].
The consumer surplus from purchasing on the REG is CSi = vi P1. To allow comparison
of consumer surplus across channels we adopt a utility framework, where the utility, U(CS),
resulting from a surplus CS is assumed to be linear, i.e. U(CS) = djCS + bj for j = 0; 1; 2
with j being a channel specic index (0 =REG,1 =OPQ,2 =BID). For simplicity, but without
loss of generality, we assume bj = 0 and d0 = 1 for consumers acquiring service from the full
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information channel. The utility for a consumer purchasing on REG is simply U(CSi) =
vi P1. As the consumer is not fully aware of all the service provider's characteristics when
purchasing through OPQ we discount the consumer surplus from purchasing on OPQ. Let d1
denote the discount factor for purchasing on OPQ resulting in utility U(CSi) = d1(vi   P2)
from purchasing on OPQ, where 0  d1 < 1. Here 1 d1 represents the opacity of the opaque
channel, implying as d1 approaches 1 the channel becomes less opaque as the consumer
discounts the surplus less. Similarly, we denote the degree of opacity of the products on the
BID channel by 1   d2. As indicated in Shapiro and Shi (2008) that the degree of opacity
is related to the numbers of competitors using the opaque channel. More specically, for
example, if there are N service providers listing their products on the opaque channel, i.e.
not disclosing their identity, then in general the consumer's chance of purchasing from one
of them is 1
N
. And so, the degree of opacity can be interpreted as a function of 1
N
.
If consumer i's valuation vi satisfying vi P1  d1(vi P2) and vi  P1, then the consumer
will prefer to purchase on the REG versus OPQ. If vi   P1 < d1(vi   P2) and vi  P2, then
they will choose OPQ to make the purchase. The customer will be indierent to purchasing
on REG and OPQ when vi =
P1 d1P2
1 d1 := V1.
Some consumers may bid rst and switch to the REG channel if their bid gets rejected
and their valuations are higher than P1. Suppose Bi is the bid that consumer i submits to
BID, and he expects it to be accepted with a probability of Bi. If the bid is rejected (with
probability of 1   Bi in consumers' belief), the consumer will go to the REG and purchase
the product at P1. Given vi  P1, the utility for consumer i is then the sum of the utilities
from a possible opaque bidding purchase and in the case their bid is rejected the utility from
purchasing at regular prices,
U(CSi) = d2(vi  Bi)Bi + (1 Bi)(vi   P1): (2)
As U(CSi) is a concave quadratic function of Bi, it is straightforward to show U(CSi) is
maximized when Bi = B

i1(vi), where
Bi1(vi) =
P1   (1  d2)vi
2d2
: (3)
As bids must be positive, i.e. Bi > 0, this results in
Bi1(vi) > 0 =) vi <
P1
1  d2 := V2; (4)
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It is easy to show that that the optimal bid is less than P1 and is decreasing in the opacity
degree on the BID channel as the products on the BID channel become less valuable for the
customers while the BID channel becomes more opaque.
For the consumer i who chooses to bid Bi1(vi), by substituting the bid back into (2)
we obtain their maximum expected surplus U(CSi1(vi)) = d2(B

i1(vi))
2 + (vi   P1), which
exceeds the utility, (vi   P1), from buying directly from the posted full information channel
as we expected. Therefore, consumers with valuation P1  vi < V2 will choose to bid
Bi1(vi) =
P1 (1 d2)vi
2d2
rst and then go to the REG channel if their bids fails.
However, from the service provider's perspective, the bid Bi1(vi) will be accepted only if
Bi1(vi) > R i.e. vi <
P1 2d2R
1 d2 := V3. This means that customers with valuations vi 2 [V3; V2)
will lose the bid (note that they do not know it before they bid) and go back to purchase on
REG. Customers with valuation vi 2 [P1; V3) will win the bid.
A subset of consumers may choose to bid rst and switch to purchase at the OPQ channel
if their bid is rejected and vi  P2. Assume Bi is the bid that consumer i submits to BID
and he believes the accepting probability is Bi. If the bid is rejected, the consumer will go
to the OPQ and purchase at P2. Given vi  P2, the surplus for consumer i is
U(CSi) = d2(vi  Bi)Bi + (1 Bi)(vi   P2) (5)
It is straightforward to show U(CSi) is maximized when Bi = B

i2(vi), where
Bi2(vi) =
d1P2   (d1   d2)vi
2d2
: (6)
As consumers bids must be positive, i.e. Bi > 0, this results in
Bi2(vi) > 0 =) vi <
d1P2
d1   d2 := V4; (7)
One can easily show that Bi2(vi) is less than P2 and we now take the rst derivative of B

i2(vi)
with respect to d1 and d2 respectively and get
dBi2(vi)
d d1
=  vi   P2
2d2
 0 since vi  P2; (8)
dBi2(vi)
d d2
=
d1(vi   P2)
2d2
2  0 since vi  P2: (9)
The optimal bid for customers who choose bid rst and go purchase at the OPQ channel if
the bid fails is decreasing in the opacity degree on BID, but increasing in the opacity degree
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on OPQ. This is because the products on the BID channel becomes less valuable for the
customers while the BID channel becomes more opaque, but becomes more valuable when
the OPQ channel becomes more opaque.
We substitute Bi2(vi) back and obtain the maximum expected utility for consumer i is
U(CSi1(vi)) = d2(B

i2(vi))
2+d1(vi P2), which exceeds the surplus, d1(vi P2), from buying
directly from the OPQ channel as desired.
However, similar to the segment of BID then purchase at REG after the bid fails, the
bid Bi2(vi) will be accepted only if B

i2(vi) > R i.e. vi <
d1P2 2d2R
d1 d2 := V5. Thus customers
with valuations vi 2 [V5; V4) will lose the bid (again, they do not know it before they bid)
and switch to purchase at OPQ. Customers with valuations vi 2 [P2; V5) will win their bid.
For consumers with valuations lower than P2, their only choice is to bid. Their surplus
is U(CSi) = d2(vi   Bi)Bi, which is maximized with Bi = Bi3(vi) = vi=2: Service provider
will only accept the bid when Bi3(vi) > R i.e. vi > 2R := V6. This means that customers
with valuations vi 2 [0; V6) will lose the bid and leave empty handed, while customers with
valuations vi 2 [V6; P2) will win their bid and get the product.
We now summarize the consumer self-selected market segmentation when the service
provider can list products on all three channels : REG, OPQ, and BID and illustrate it by
using critical points V1; P1; V2; V4; P2. Based on the relationship between the discount factors
d1; d2 and prices P1; P2 posted on channels REG and OPQ as well as the previous analysis,
there are two cases of consumer market segmentation as follows:
Case I. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2)  0, V4  V2  V1.
The three channels REG, OPQ and BID partition consumers into four potential segments
as shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Market Segmentation - Case I
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Segment 1 > V2 V2  1 > V1 V1  1
[V2; 1] REG Present Absent Absent
[V1;min(V2; 1)) BID then REG Present Present Absent
[P2;min(V1; 1)) BID then OPQ Present Present Present
[0; P2) BID Present Present Present
Where, REG denotes buying on REG only; BID then REG denotes biding then purchas-
ing at REG if bid fails; BID then OPQ denotes biding then purchasing at OPQ if bid fails;
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BID denotes biding only.
Case II. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2) > 0, V4 < V2 < V1 and V1  P1  P2.
Note that this case only exists when d1 > d2, since when d1  d2, (d1  d2)P1  d1P2(1 
d2)  0:
In this case, the three channels REG, OPQ and BID partition consumers into four po-
tential segments as displayed in Table 3.
Table 3: Market Segmentation - Case II
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Segment 1 > V1 V1  1 > V3 V3  1
[V1; 1] REG Present Absent Absent
[V3;min(V1; 1)) OPQ Present Present Absent
[P2;min(V3; 1)) BID then OPQ Present Present Present
[0; P2) BID Present Present Present
Where, REG denotes buying on REG only; OPQ denotes buying on OPQ only; BID
then OPQ denotes biding then purchasing at OPQ if bid fails; BID denotes biding only.
Figure 8 displays the market segmentation of these two cases. Since the market segmen-
tation is formed by consumer self-selection, it will not change when the capacity constraint
C added in the model.
2.2 Optimal Service Provider Policies
In this section, we solve for the optimal prices and threshold set on the channels REG, OPQ
and BID respectively and the resulting maximum expected revenue for a service provider
under both segmentation cases discussed previously. As mentioned before we assume all
revenues are normalized to a market of one, as such expected revenue values are per customer,
and they do not face a capacity constraint.
As discussed earlier that Bi1(vi); B

i2(vi); and B

i3(vi) are the optimal bids for the con-
sumers in the segments of BID and purchase at REG if the bid fails, BID and purchase at
OPQ if the bid fails and BID only respectively. However, from the perspective of the service
provider, those bids can be accepted only when they are more than the threshold R, i.e.
Bi1(vi) > R;B

i2(vi) > R; and B

i3(vi) > R. This implies consumers in those three segments
will win the biding if their valuations vi < V3; vi < V5, and vi > V6 respectively. Hence,
V3; V5; V6 are critical points for determining which channels the revenue is actually coming
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Case I
0 1
V2 =
P1
1 d2
V1 =
P1 d1P2
1 d1
BiE =
d1P2 (d1 d2)vi
2d2
BiC =
P1 (1 d2)vi
2d2
BiD =
vi
2
BiEBiCBiD P 1s V2sV1sP2s
- A -C -E- D
A - REG only customers
C - BID then REG customers
E - BID then OPQ customers
D - BID only customers
Case II
0 1
V1 =
P1 d1P2
1 d1
V4 =
d1P2
d1 d2
BiE =
d1P2 (d1 d2)vi
2d2
BiD =
vi
2
BiEBiD V1sV4sP2s
- A -B -E- D
A - REG only customers
B - OPQ only
E - BID then OPQ customers
D - BID only customers
Figure 8: Market segmentation from using all three channels
from. Recall that V1; P1; V2; V4; P2 are the critical points for consumer market segmenta-
tion and based on the relations among d1; d2; P1; and P2 there are the two segmentation
cases. From the perspective of the service provider, We now have several sub-scenarios in
each segmentation case according to the relations among d1; d2; P1; P2 and R, and display
the scenarios using all the critical points V1; V2; V3; V4; V5; V6; P1; and P2 as discussed in the
following.
Case I. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2)  0, V4  V2  V1.
Recall that the consumer segmentation given in Table 2.
There are three revenue segmentation scenarios in this market segmentation case.
Case I - Scenario I. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2)   2d2R(1  d1)
Consumers in the rst segment [V2; 1] (if V2 < 1) buy on REG directly. It is straightfor-
ward to check that (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2)   2d2R(1  d1) is equivalent to
P1   2d2R
1  d2 
P1   d1P2
1  d1 ; i.e. V3  V1:
Thus the segment BID then REG ([V1;min(V2; 1))) is divided into two groups of customers
with the rst group vi 2 [min(V3; 1);min(V2; 1)) purchases on REG and second group vi 2
[V1;min(V3; 1)) wins the bid.
15
One can also easily show that V3  V1 ) V5  V1, then in the segment of BID then OPQ
(vi 2 [P2;min(V1; 1))), all consumers will win their bids since their optimal bids are above
the threshold R as long as their valuation vi  V5.
V5  V1  P1  P2 (since if P1 < P2, no one would buy on REG, i.e. there is no REG
only segment existing) ) P2  V6, then in the segment of biding only, consumers with
valuations vi 2 [V6; P2) win their biding and consumers with valuations vi 2 [0; V6) lose.
Table 4 summarizes this revenue segmentation.
Table 4: Revenue segmentation, Case I - Scenario I
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Transaction channel 1 > V3 V3  1 > V1 V1  1
[V3; 1] REG (P1) Present Absent Absent
[V1;min(V3; 1)) BID (B

i1(vi)) Present Present Absent
[P2;min(V1; 1)) BID (B

i2(vi)) Present Present Present
[V6; P2) BID (B

i3(vi)) Present Present Present
Therefore, if 1  V3  V1 i.e.(d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2)   2d2R(1 d1) and P1 2d2R 
1  d2, then the expected revenue  for the service provider in this scenario is:
 =
Z 1
V3
P1f(vi)dvi +
Z V3
V1
Bi1(vi)f(vi)dvi +
Z V1
P2
Bi2(vi)f(vi)dvi +
Z P2
V6
Bi3(vi)f(vi)dvi
=
[ d1(P1   P2)2   4( 1 + d1)d22P1( 1 + 2R) + d2(( 3 + 4d1)P12 + d1P22
 2P1( 2 + d1(2 + P2))  4R2 + 4d1R2)]
4( 1 + d1)( 1 + d2)d2 (10)
where, recall that
Bi1(vi) =
P1   (1  d2)vi
2d2
; Bi3(vi) =
vi
2
; Bi2(vi) =
d1P2   (d1   d2)vi
2d2
;
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1  d1 ; V3 =
P1   2d2R
1  d2 ; V6 = 2R:
We take the derivatives of  in (10) with respect to P1; P2; R and set equal to zero, and
solve for the optimal solutions as the follows:
P 1 = P

2 =
2(1  d2)
3  4d22
; R =
2d2(1  d2)
3  4d22
= d2P

1 (11)
Furthermore, one can show that the Hessian matrix is negative-denite. Substituting optimal
prices P 1 , P

2 and R
 into (10), we have the maximum expected revenue ,
 =
1  d2
3  4d22
(12)
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We can see that although there are three channels and four customer segments in this
scenario, the service provider only has two sources of revenue: REG and BID as the OPQ
channel is not generating sales. This is because the price on OPQ is set the same as that on
REG and the threshold on the BID channel is set relatively low so that all the consumers in
the segment of BID then OPQ will win their bids and will not switch to OPQ.
Parameters d1; d2 need to satisfy constraints obtained by substituting optimal prices P

1 ,
P 2 and R
 as shown in (11) into the conditions in this scenario: (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) 
 2d2R(1   d1); P1   2d2R  1   d2; and P1 2 [0; 1]; P2 2 [0; 1]: Here, the constraint is just
simply 0  d2  1=2, which has nothing to do with d1 since the results are only functions of
d2 . Under this constraint, one can show that both the optimal full information price and the
maximum expected revenue in this scenario are more than those values in the situation where
there is only the REG channel, which are 1
2
and 1
4
respectively. Please see the Appendix for
the detailed derivation of the results discussed above.
Case I - Scenario II. 0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2) >  2d2R(1  d1) and P2  2R:
As the same as in previous scenario, the consumers in the rst segment [V2; 1] (if V2 < 1)
buy on REG directly. It is easy to see that (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) >  2d2R(1   d1) is
equivalent to
P1   2d2R
1  d2 <
P1   d1P2
1  d1 ; i.e. V3 < V1:
Thus, all the consumers in the segment of BID then REG ([V1;min(V2; 1)))lose their bids
and go to purchase at REG as their bids are below the threshold R if their valuation is more
than V3.
One can easily show that V3 < V1 implies V5 < V1 and if P2  2R; then P2  V5, so the
segment of BID then OPQ (vi 2 [P2;min(V1; 1))) consists of two groups of consumers. The
rst group of consumers with valuations vi 2 [V5;min(V1; 1)) purchase on OPQ and second
group vi 2 [P2;min(V5; 1)) wins the bid.
P2  2R indicates P2  V6, then in the segment of biding only, consumers with valuations
vi 2 [V6; P2) win their biding and consumers with valuations vi 2 [0; V6) lose. The revenue
segmentation for the service provider in this scenario is summarized in Table 5.
Thus, if 1  V1 > V3 and 1  V5  P2 i.e. 0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2) >  2d2R(1 
d1); P1   d1P2  1   d1 and P2  2R, then the expected revenue  for the service provider
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Table 5: Revenue segmentation, Case I - Scenario II
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Transaction channel 1 > V1 V1  1 > V5 V5  1
[V1; 1] REG (P1) Present Absent Absent
[V5;min(V1; 1)) OPQ (P2) Present Present Absent
[P2;min(V5; 1)) BID (B

i2(vi)) Present Present Present
[V6; P2) BID (B

i3(vi)) Present Present Present
in this scenario is:
 =
Z 1
V1
P1f(vi)dvi +
Z V1
V5
P2f(vi)dvi +
Z V5
P2
Bi2(vi)f(vi)dvi +
Z P2
V6
Bi3(vi)f(vi)dvi
=
[4d2(P1   P12 + P1P2   2P2R) + d12( 4P1( 1 + P2) + P22   4R2)
+
d1(4P1
2 + 4P1( 1 + d2( 1 + P2)  P2) + (3  4d2)P22 + 8d2P2R + 4R2)]
4( 1 + d1)(d1   d2) (13)
where, recall that
Bi3(vi) =
d2vi
2
; Bi2(vi) =
P2   (d1   d2)vi
2
;
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1  d1 ; V5 =
d1P2   2d2R
d1   d2 ; V6 = 2R:
As earlier, taking the derivatives of  in (13) with respect to P1; P2; R and setting to
zero, we solve for the optimal solutions.
P 1 =
d1
3 + d1
2(3  4d2)  4d22 + 4d1d22
2(d1
3   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
P 2 =
d1(1 + d1)(d1   d2)
d1
3   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22
;
R =
d2(1 + d1)(d1   d2)
d1
3   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22
(14)
One can show that the Hessian matrix is negative-denite and substituting optimal prices
P 1 , P

2 and R
 in (13), one can get the maximum expected revenue ,
 =
d1
3 + d1
2(3  4d2)  4d22 + 4d1d22
4(d1
3   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
(15)
As before parameters d1; d2 need to satisfy a set of constraints; which are obtained by
substituting optimal prices P 1 , P

2 and R
 as shown in (14) into: 0  (d1  d2)P1  d1P2(1 
d2) >  2d2R(1  d1); P1   d1P2  1  d1; P2  2R; and P1 2 [0; 1]; P2 2 [0; 1]:
Hence, the constraints that d1; d2 need to satisfy are shown in (16), (17), (18), and (19).
Similar to the previous scenario, under these constraints, one can show that both the optimal
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full information price and the maximum expected revenue in this scenario are larger than 1
2
and 1
4
respectively. The appendix provides the detailed derivation.
d1
3   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22  0 (16)
d2  d1
2
(17)
4d2
3 + d1
2( 1 + 2d2) + d1(d2   6d22) < 0 (18)
4d1d2
2   4d23 + d13( 1 + 2d2) + d12(d2   2d22)  0 (19)
Case I - Scenario III. 0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2) >  2d2R(1  d1) and P2 < 2R.
As in previous scenarios, consumers in the rst segment [V2; 1] (if V2 < 1) buy on REG
directly. And (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2) >  2d2R(1  d1) implies
P1   2d2R
1  d2 <
P1   d1P2
1  d1 ; i.e. V3 < V1:
Hence, all the consumers in the segment BID then REG ([V1;min(V2; 1))) lose their bids and
purchase at the REG channel as their bids are below the threshold R if their valuation is
more than V3.
If P2 < 2R, then V5 < P2, and so all the consumers in the segment of BID then OPQ
lose their bids and so switch back to the OPQ channel to buy as their bids are less than the
threshold R if the valuation vi > V5.
P2 < 2R also indicates P2 < V6, then in the segment of biding only, all consumers will lose
their bid as Bi < R if their valuation is less than V6. In summary, the revenue segmentation
in this scenario is given in Table 6.
Table 6: Revenue segmentation, Case I - Scenario III
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Transaction channel 1 > V1 V1  1 > P2
[V1; 1] REG (P1) Present Absent
[P2;min(V1; 1)) OPQ (P2) Present Present
Therefore, if 1  V1 and P2  V5 i.e. 0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) >  2d2R(1  
d1); P1   d1P2  1   d1 and P2 < 2R, then every possible transaction interval in Table 6 is
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present and produces :
 =
Z 1
V1
P1f(vi)dvi +
Z V1
P2
P2f(vi)dvi
=
(1  d1   P1 + d1P2)P1 + P2(P1   P2)
1  d1 (20)
Taking the rst partial derivatives of  with respect to P1 and P2 respectively and setting
them to zero,
P 1 =
2
3 + d1
; P 2 =
1 + d1
3 + d1
(21)
It is easy to show that the Hessian matrix is again negative-denite, substituting P 1 and
P 2 in (21) into (20), and we have the maximum expected revenue 
 is:
 =
1
3 + d1
(22)
As shown above REG and OPQ are the only two channels with sales. This happens when
the threshold on the BID channel is set so high that the consumers in both BID then
OPQ segment and the BID only segment lose their bid. In fact, from the conditions 0 
(d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) >  2d2R(1 d1); P1 d1P2  1 d1 and P2 < 2R we can see that
R > max

P 2
2
;
 (d1   d2)P 1 + d1P 2 (1  d2)
2d2(1  d1)

:
By substituting P 1 and P

2 shown in (21) back into the inequality above, we have
R > max

1 + d1
2(3 + d1)
;
2d2   d1(1  d2)
2d2(3 + d1)

:
Since
2d2   d1(1  d2)
2d2(3 + d1)
  1 + d1
2(3 + d1)
=
d2   d1
6d2 + 2d1d2
;
so the lower bound of the optimal threshold
RL =
(
2d2 d1(1 d2)
2d2(3+d1)
if d1 < d2
1+d1
2(3+d1)
otherwise
(23)
Therefore, the optimal threshold R 2 [RL; P 2 ]. Substituting the optimal solutions P 1 ; P 2 ,
and R > P 2 =2 back in the conditions 0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) >  2d2R(1  
d1); P1   d1P2  1  d1 and P2 < 2R to get the constraint that d1 and d2 need to satisfy is
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d1  2d2=(1   d2). It is easy to see that  2d2=(1   d2) > d2, thus, the lower bound of the
optimal threshold becomes
RL =
(
2d2 d1(1 d2)
2d2(3+d1)
if d1 < d2
1+d1
2(3+d1)
if d2  d1  2d21 d2
(24)
One can check that under this constraint the optimal REG price and the maximum
expected revenue in this scenario are greater than or equal to those values in the situation
where there is only REG channel i.e. 1
2
and 1
4
respectively. The details are provided in the
Appendix.
Case II. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2) > 0, V4 < V2 < V1.
The market segmentation in Case II was previously summarized in Table 3. Note that
this case only exists when d1 > d2, since when d1  d2, d1P2(1  d2)  (d1   d2)P1 > 0:
V4 =
d1P2
d1 d2 ; V5 =
P2 2R
d1 d2 implies V4  P2; and V4  V5. And recall that the consumers
with valuations vi < V5 and vi > V6 will win the biding in the segments of BID then OPQ
and BID only respectively. Hence, we only need to compare the critical points V5, P2 and
V6 to decide for the revenue segments in this subcase. There are two revenue segmentation
scenarios based on the relations among d1; d2; P1; P2; and R as discussed in the following .
Case II - Scenario I. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2) > 0 and 2R  P2.
Recall that the segment [V1; 1] (if V1 < 1) and [V 4;min(V1; 1)) are the segment of REG
only and OPQ only segments respectively. If 2R  P2, then V5  P2  V6, then the
segment of BID then OPQ (vi 2 [P2;min(V4; 1))) consists of two groups of consumers. The
rst group of consumers with valuation vi 2 [V5;min(V4; 1)) purchases on OPQ and second
group vi 2 [P2;min(V5; 1)) wins the bid. And in the segment of biding only, consumers
with valuation vi 2 [V6; P2) win their bid and consumers with valuation vi 2 [0; V6) lose. In
summary, the revenue segmentation for the service provider in this scenario is given in Table
7.
Table 7: Revenue segmentation, Case II - Scenario I
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Transaction channel 1 > V1 V1  1 > V5 V5  1
[V1; 1] REG (P1) Present Absent Absent
[V5;min(V1; 1)) OPQ (P2) Present Present Absent
[P2;min(V5; 1)) BID (B

i2(vi)) Present Present Present
[V6; P2) BID (B

i3(vi)) Present Present Present
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Thus, if V1  1 and V5  P2  V6 i.e. (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) > 0 and P1 d1P2  1 d1
and 2R  P2, then every possible transaction interval in Table 7 is present, with  for the
service provider in this scenario:
 =
Z 1
V1
P1f(vi)dvi +
Z V1
V5
P2f(vi)dvi +
Z V5
P2
Bi2(vi)f(vi)dvi +
Z P2
V6
Bi3(vi)f(vi)dvi (25)
where, recall that
Bi3(vi) =
d2vi
2
; Bi2(vi) =
P2   (d1   d2)vi
2
;
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1  d1 ; V5 =
d1P2   2d2R
d1   d2 ; V6 = 2R:
As in Case I, Scenario II above that the service provider uses all three channels by setting
the appropriate threshold and prices on the channels. And it has the same revenue expression
(25) but with slightly dierent parameter constraints. Therefore, the optimal prices and
expected revenue in this scenario are also given by (14), (15) above respectively. One can
derive the parameter constraints that need to be satised in this scenario by substituting
P 1 ; P

2 and R
 in (14) into conditions (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) > 0; P1 d1P2  1 d1; 2R 
P2; P1 2 [0; 1]; P2 2 [0; 1]; and P2  P1:
Specically, the constraints are (16), (17), (18), and
4d1d2
2   4d23 + d13( 1 + 2d2) + d12(d2   2d22) < 0; (26)
whose inequality sign is just in the opposite direction from the fourth condition (19) in Case
I, Scenario II.
Case II - Scenario II. (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) > 0 and P1 d1P2  1 d1 and 2R > P2.
Consumers in the segment of [V1; 1] (if V1 < 1) and [V 4;min(V1; 1)) buy at REG only
and OPQ only respectively. If 2R > P2, then V5 < P2 < V6, then for both the segments of
BID then OPQ (vi 2 [P2;min(V4; 1))) and BID only (vi 2 [0; P2), there are no consumers
will win the bids.
Table 8 shows the revenue segmentation in this scenario.
Table 8: Revenue segmentation, Case II - Scenario II
Critical Points
Valuation (vi) Transaction channel 1 > V1 V1  1 > P2
[V1; 1] REG (P1) Present Absent
[P2;min(V1; 1)) OPQ (P2) Present Present
22
Therefore, if 1  V1 and P2  V5 i.e. (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1   d2) > 0 and P1   d1P2 
1  d1 and 2R > P2, then every possible transaction interval in Table 8 is present producing
expected revenue :
 =
Z 1
V1
P1f(vi)dvi +
Z V1
P2
P2f(vi)dvi (27)
Substituting optimal prices P 1 and P

2 ; as shown in 21 and R
 > P 2 =2 back in the
conditions (d1  d2)P1  d1P2(1  d2) > 0 and P1  d1P2  1  d1 and 2R > P2 and P2 < 2R
we get d1 > 2d2=(1 d2) as the parameter constraints in scenario. Note that this is just with
an opposite sign from the parameter condition in Case I - Scenario III. As R > P 2 =2, we
have the lower bound of the optimal threshold
RL = P

2 =2 =
1 + d1
2(3 + d1)
;
and the optimal threshold will still be R 2 [RL; P 2 ].
Overall, in the situation where the service provider releases their products on all three
channels: REG, OPQ and BID, we have ve scenarios of revenue segmentation as summarized
in Table 9.
Table 9: Results in revenue segmentation sub-scenarios
Scenario Optimal price Optimal price Optimal threshold Maximum expected Parameter
on REG (P 1 ) on OPQ (P

2 ) on BID (R
) revenue () conditions
(d1; d2)
Case I-I 2(1 d2)
3 4d22
2(1 d2)
3 4d22
2d2(1 d2)
3 4d22
1 d2
3 4d22 0  d2 
1
2
Case I-II d1
3+d1
2(3 4d2) 4d22+4d1d22
2(d1
3 d12( 2+d2)+d1d2 4d22)
d1(1+d1)(d1 d2)
d1
3 d12( 2+d2)+d1d2 4d22
d2(1+d1)(d1 d2)
d1
3 d12( 2+d2)+d1d2 4d22
d1
3+d1
2(3 4d2) 4d22+4d1d22
4(d1
3 d12( 2+d2)+d1d2 4d22) (16), (17),
(18), (19)
Case I-III 2
3+d1
1+d1
3+d1
[2d2 d1(1 d2)
2d2(3+d1)
; 1+d1
3+d1
] 1
3+d1
d1 < d2
2
3+d1
1+d1
3+d1
[ 1+d1
2(3+d1)
; 1+d1
3+d1
] 1
3+d1
d2  d1  2d21 d2
Case II-I Same as Case I-II (16), (17),
(18), (26)
Case II-II 2
3+d1
1+d1
3+d1
[ 1+d1
2(3+d1)
; 1+d1
3+d1
] 1
3+d1
d1 >
2d2
(1 d2)
2.2.1 Illustration of the Optimal Policies
In this section we illustrate optimal policies and the resulting segmentation substituting
dierent values of d1 and d2 into the closed-form solutions discussed previously and plot
them to illustrate the impact of channel opacity on the revenue, prices, and threshold.
As mentioned before that given the values of d1 and d2 the optimal policy that the service
provider will implement is to set the prices and threshold at the values of the solutions in the
revenue segmentation scenario that achieves the maximum expected revenue. Of course, this
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Figure 9: Optimal expected revenue - left unconstrained, right limited capacity
revenue segmentation scenario is based on the corresponding market segmentation formed by
consumers self-selection according to the values of d1; d2; and the prices P1 and P2. Therefore,
the service provider sets the prices and threshold on REG, OPQ and BID such that they
can induce the market segmentation and produce the desired revenue segmentation given
the values of d1 and d2.
We plot the maximum expected revenue that the service provider can obtain while re-
leasing products on REG, OPQ and BID channels and the corresponding optimal prices and
threshold set on those channels as given in (9). It is analytically illustrated in the Appendix
that the maximum expected revenue and the posted price on REG in all ve scenarios are
more than those in the base case: REG only, so the maximum expected revenue and corre-
sponding posted price on REG in this three channel case are also greater than those values
in the REG only case, which are 1
4
and 1
2
respectively . One can also see this property in the
plots.
The optimal revenues the rm receives from posting optimal prices at the full information
channel (REG) and the opaque channel (OPQ) and the threshold set on the biding channel
(BID) are displayed in Figures 9, 10, 11, 12 respectively.
As shown in Figures 10, 11 prices on REG decrease as BID and OPQ become less opaque,
conversely OPQ prices increase (and converge to REG prices) as opacity on OPQ decreases,
but decreases as opacity on BID decreases. Figure 12 shows that BID thresholds increase
as opacity on BID decreases, but decreases as opacity on OPQ decreases. The impacts of
channel opacity on optimal prices and threshold indicate that when the products on the
opaque channels (OPQ and BID) become more valuable (less opaque), the price on the full
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Figure 10: Optimal regular prices - left unconstrained, right limited capacity
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Figure 11: Optimal opaque prices - left unconstrained, right limited capacity
information channel (REG) can not be set too high to lose consumers. Similarly, if the
BID channel becomes less opaque, some consumers on OPQ may switch to bid on the BID
channel due to a potential chance of getting a better value with less price, vice versa.
As displayed in Figure 9 that the maximum expected revenue decreases when either OPQ
or BID channel's opacity degree decreases (d's increase). This implies that the more opaque
those opaque channels are, the more segments in the market and so the service provider can
capture more consumers because of their heterogenous valuations of the product.
2.3 Optimal Service Provider Policies with Limited Capacity
In this section, we consider the setting where capacity is limited and as such the rm would
logically limit sales at lower prices. We assume that the service provider has a limited
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Figure 12: Optimal bidding thresholds - left unconstrained, right limited capacity
inventory of capacity C < 1. Although we have the capacity constraint in this case, the
consumer segmentation and the revenue segmentation will still be the same as the case with
abundant capacity discussed in earlier sections. However, the optimal pricing policy and the
maximum expected revenue that the service provider can achieve will depend on capacity.
Here, we assume the customers arrive in a random order, i.e. rst come rst serve.
Thus, the capacity C will be allocated to each segment of the market proportional to it size
relative to the total demand in the market, otherwise referred to as random or proportionate
splitting.
As an illustration on how the limited capacity inuences the service provider's pricing
policy and maximum revenue that can be achieved, we assume that the service provider sells
the products only on the REG channel and set its price as P1.
Similar to the situation with no capacity constraint, consumers with valuation higher
than the price P1 will purchase through this channel. However, demand can be met only
up to C. In other words, when the total demand 1   P1  C, the situation is exactly
the same as the case with no capacity constraint discussed previously, and so the revenue
is C = (1   P1)P1, which reaches the maximum value C = 14 at P 1 C = 12 . But when
1 P1 > C, the revenue is C = CP1. Thus, the price P1 increases until it reaches the upper
bound 1  C and the maximum revenue C = C(1  C) is achieved.
We summarize the results as the following:
If 1  C  1
2
i.e. C  1
2
, then C =
1
4
and P 1 C =
1
2
;
If 1  C > 1
2
i.e. C < 1
2
, then C = C(1  C) and P 1 C = 1  C.
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One can easily show that when C < 1
2
, C = C(1   C) is an increasing function in the
capacity C, and P 1 C is decreasing in C. These are quite intuitive as when we can not meet
all demand we receive less revenue but through higher prices.
The service provider now lists the products on the REG, OPQ and BID simultaneously.
They set price P1 on REG, P2 on OPQ, a biding threshold R on BID, and consumers expect
that it follows a uniform distribution over [0; 1]. In this constrained capacity case, we have
three cases as follows, recalling that in the case of no capacity constraint, we have two cases
of market segmentation and up to three scenarios in each case based on relations between
d1; d2.
Constrained Case I.
Capacity C is allocated proportionally and from (10) we know that the total demand that
is supposed to be met if we have enough capacity is 1   2R. Thus, if the conditions (d1  
d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2)   2d2R(1 d1); P1 2d2R  1 d2; are satised and C  1 2R, then
the expected revenue C is the same as the revenue  in the case of no capacity constraint.
If C < 1  2R, then the expected revenue C is :
C =
R 1
V3
f(vi)dvi
1  2R  C  P1 +
R V3
V1
f(vi)dvi
1  2R  C 
R V3
V1
Bi1(vi)f(vi)dviR V3
V1
f(vi)dvi
+
R V1
P2
Bi2(vi)f(vi)dvi
1  2R  C 
R V1
P2
Bi2(vi)f(vi)dviR V1
P2
f(vi)dvi
+
R P2
V6
Bi3(vi)f(vi)dvi
1  2R  C 
R P2
V6
Bi3(vi)f(vi)dviR P2
V6
f(vi)dvi
=
C
1  2R [
Z 1
V3
P1f(vi)dvi +
Z V3
V1
Bi1(vi)f(vi)dvi +
Z V1
P2
Bi2(vi)f(vi)dvi
+
Z P2
V6
Bi3(vi)f(vi)dvi]
=
C
1  2R   (28)
where,
Bi1(vi) =
P1   (1  d2)vi
2d2
; Bi3(vi) =
vi
2
; Bi2(vi) =
d1P2   (d1   d2)vi
2d2
;
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1  d1 ; V3 =
P1   2d2R
1  d2 ; V6 = 2R;
 = the revenue of the Case I-Scenario I without a capacity constraint.
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Constrained Case II
Case I - Scenario II and Case II - Scenario I have the same revenue functions in terms of
P1; P2; R; d1 and d2 as shown in (13), but with dierent parameter constraints. Thus, in
the case with capacity constraint C we combine these two scenarios together, and similar to
the Constrained Case I above, the total demand that we need to meet if we have abundant
capacity is 1  2R.
If the conditions of the scenarios (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) >  2d2R(1 d1); P1 d1P2 
1   d1; P2  2R; are satised and C  1   2R, the expected revenue C is the same as the
revenue  in the case of no capacity constraint. If C < 1   2R, the expected revenue C
with capacity C is given as below:
C =
R 1
V1
f(vi)dvi
1  2R  C  P1 +
R V1
V5
f(vi)dvi
1  2R  C  P2 +
R V5
P2
f(vi)dvi
1  2R  C 
R V5
P2
Bi2(vi)f(vi)dviR V5
P2
f(vi)dvi
+
R P2
V6
f(vi)dvi
1  2R  C 
R P2
V6
Bi3(vi)f(vi)dviR P2
V6
f(vi)dvi
=
C
1  2R [
Z 1
V1
P1f(vi)dvi +
Z V1
V5
P2f(vi)dvi +
Z V5
P2
Bi2(vi)f(vi)dvi
+
Z P2
V6
Bi3(vi)f(vi)dvi]
=
C
1  2R   (29)
where,
Bi3(vi) =
d2vi
2
; Bi2(vi) =
P2   (d1   d2)vi
2
;
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1  d1 ; V5 =
d1P2   2d2R
d1   d2 ; V6 = 2R;
 = the revenue of the Case II-Scenario I or Case II-Scenario I in the case with no capacity
constraint.
Constrained Case III.
Recall that Case I-Scenario III and Case II-Scenario II have the same revenue functions of
P1; P2; R; d1 and d2 as given in (20) but with dierent parameter constraints. Hence, we
combine these two scenarios together in the setting with constrained capacity and note the
total demand that we need to meet if we have abundant capacity is now 1  P2.
Thus, if the conditions (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) >  2d2R(1 d1); P1 d1P2  1 d1; P2 <
2R in the scenarios are satised and C  1 P2, then the expected revenue C with capacity
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C is the same as the expected revenue  with no constrained capacity. If C < 1  P2, then
the expected revenue C given as the follows.
C =
R 1
V1
f(vi)dvi
1  P2  C  P1 +
R V1
P2
f(vi)dvi
1  P2  C  P2
=
C
1  P2 [
Z 1
V1
P1f(vi)dvi +
Z V1
P2
P2f(vi)dvi]
=
C
1  P2   (30)
where,
V1 =
P1   d1P2
1  d1 ;
 = the revenue of the Case I-Scenario II or Case II Scenario II sub-scenario I-ii with no
capacity constraint.
Similar to the abundant capacity case, we will choose the one out of these three cases
that achieves the highest maximum expected revenue when it is feasible and so set the
corresponding optimal prices and threshold which are functions of capacity C in this situ-
ation. We solve for the optimal prices, threshold and so the resulting maximum expected
revenue numerically. The resulting optimal revenues, prices and thresholds for a capacity of
0.55 are shown in concert with the earlier unconstrained results in Figures 9, 10, 11 and 12
respectively.
3. Discussion
Figure 13 displays the channels across which the service provider conducts transactions
provided they set optimal prices and thresholds as displayed in Figures 10, 11 and 12. These
transactions are a function of consumer self-selected segmentation as illustrated in Figure
14. Figure 15 displays optimal expected revenues for increasing capacity for a selection of
d1 and d2 values.
Together these gures illustrate the impacts of opaque selling and under what conditions
it appears fruitful to consumers and service providers. Firms should always adopt at least
two channels, selling via opaque posted prices in addition to regular full information prices.
The opaque posted prices simply approach regular full information prices as the opaque
channel becomes less opaque - this is consistent across unlimited and constrained capacity
settings. Similarly rms should employ opaque bidding but only when opacity of this channel
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Figure 13: Optimal channel strategies - left unconstrained, right limited capacity
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Figure 14: Market segmentation - left unconstrained, right limited capacity
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Figure 15: Optimal expected revenue as a function of capacity
is signicant - here d2 <
1
2
. It is important to realize that the rm should always be using all
three channels, with posted opaque prices/thresholds set too high such that no transactions
occur under conditions of decreased opacity. As capacity becomes tighter, the required degree
of opacity increases (for continued use of opaque channels) as do prices and thresholds.
As indicated earlier, and as displayed in Figure 9 that the maximum expected revenue
decreases as opacity decreases. This implies that the more opaque those opaque channels are,
the more segments in the market and so the service provider can capture more consumers
because of their heterogenous valuations of the product. This is consistent with what we
see in practice as opaque channels tend to separate themselves along degrees of opacity,
for example Hotwire.com provides information of hotel amenities as well as feedback from
recent guests whereas Priceline.com provides neither on its NYOP bidding channel indicating
Hotwire is probably less opaque than Priceline.
In summary we have developed a stylized model of when and how to deploy and opaque
selling strategy in concert with regular full information pricing. Unlike previous research
which usually assumes an exogenous consumer separation into regular consumers and opaque
consumers we endogenously model this channel selection process as a function of prices and
channel characteristics (opacity). We have shown that even in the face of capacity con-
straints rms should be using opaque channels whereas historically focus has been on using
opaque channels to sell distressed or otherwise unsellable inventory (surplus capacity). The
simultaneous use of opaque selling with regular full information selling, eectively segments
consumers - allowing rms to sell at higher prices to higher valuation/brand loyal consumers
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and at lower prices to lower valuation/brand agnostic shoppers via opaque channels.
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Appendix
This section includes the detailed discussion and derivation for some of the results in Case
I - Scenarios I, II and III in section 2.2.
Case I - Scenario I.
Here, we derive the constraints that parameters d1; d2 need to satisfy in this sub-scenario
by substituting optimal prices P 1 , P

2 and R
 as shown in (11) into the conditions in this
scenario: (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2)   2d2R(1 d1); P1 2d2R  1 d2; P1 2 [0; 1]; P2 2 [0; 1];.
0  P1  1) 0  d2 
p
5 + 1
4
;
(d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2)   2d2R(1  d1)
) (d1   d2)  d1(1  d2)   2d22(1  d1)) 0  d2  1
2
;
P1   2d2R  1  d2
) 2(1  2d2
2)
3  4d22
 1 which is true given 0  d2  1
2
above: (31)
Therefore, we obtain the constraint that the parameter d2 needs to satisfy, which is
0  d2  1=2. Under this constraint, one can show that both the optimal full information
price and the maximum expected revenue in this sub-scenario are more than those values in
case I where there is only the REG channel, which are 1=2 and 1=4 respectively, since we
have the follows:
P 1  
1
2
=
2(1  d2)
3  4d22
  1
2
=
(1  2d2)2
3  4d22
 0 if d2  1
2
   1
4
=
1  d2
3  4d22
  1
4
=
(1  2d2)2
4(3  4d22)
 0 if d2  1
2
Case I - Scenario II.
Similar to the above scenario, we derive the constraints that parameters d1; d2 need to
satisfy by substituting optimal prices P 1 , P

2 and R
 as shown in (14) into the conditions in
this sub-scenario: 0  (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 d2) >  2d2R(1 d1); P1 d1P2  1 d1; P2  2R;
and P1 2 [0; 1]; P2 2 [0; 1].
P2  0) d13   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22  0 (32)
P2  2R) d2  d1
2
(33)
34
(d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2) >  2d2R(1  d1)
) ( 1 + d1)d1(4d2
3 + d1
2( 1 + 2d2) + d1(d2   6d22))
2(d1
3   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
> 0
) 4d23 + d12( 1 + 2d2) + d1(d2   6d22) < 0 (34)
since constraint (32) above and d1  1
0  (d1   d2)P1   d1P2(1  d2)
) ( 1 + d1)(4d1d2
2   4d23 + d13( 1 + 2d2) + d12(d2   2d22))
2(d1
3   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
 0
) 4d1d22   4d23 + d13( 1 + 2d2) + d12(d2   2d22)  0 (35)
since constraint (32) above and d1  1
On the other hand, constraint (33) d2  d1=2 ) d12 + 2d1d2   4d22  0; so combining
this with constraint (32) gives us the following:
P1   1 =   (1 + d1)(d1
2 + 2d1d2   4d22)
2(d1
3   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
 0
P1   d1P2
1  d1   1 =  
d1
2 + 2d1d2   4d22
2(d1
3   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
 0
Therefore, (32), (33), (34), and (35) are the constraints that parameters d1; d2 need to
satisfy in this scenario in order that the optimal solutions (14) and optimal expected revenue
(15) are feasible.
Under the constraints (32), (33), (34), and (35), one can show that both the optimal full
information price and the maximum expected revenue in this scenario are also more than
1=2 and 1=4 respectively. In fact, we have
   1
3 + d1
=
(1 + d1)
2(d1   2d2)2
4(3 + d1)(d1
3   d12( 2 + d2) + d1d2   4d22)
 0 given condition (32) (36)
On the other hand,
1
3 + d1
 1
4
for 0  d1 < 1:
Therefore,   1=4. Since P 1 = =2, so P i  1=2.
Case I - Scenario III. Similarly, we obtain the constraints that d1:d2 need to satisfy by
plugging the optimal solutions P 1 ; P

2 ; and R
 into the conditions 0  (d1 d2)P1 d1P2(1 
35
d2) >  2d2R(1   d1); P1   d1P2  1   d1 and P2 < 2R. Note that P 1 = 2P 2 =(1 + d1),
R > P 2 =2; P1 2 [0; 1]; and P2 2 [0; 1].
In fact,
(d1   d2)P 1   d1P 2 (1  d2) + 2d2R(1  d1)
> P 2 [
2
1 + d1
(d1   d2)  d1(1  d2) + d2(1  d1)]
= P 2 [
2
1 + d1
(d1   d2)  (d1   d2)]  P 2 [d1   d2   (d1   d2)]  0;
(37)
P 1   d1P 2
1  d1   1 =
 1
3 + d1
< 0;
(d1   d2)P 1   d1P 2 (1  d2) =
(1  d1)(d1   d1d2   2d2)
3 + d1
 0) d1  2d2
1  d2
(38)
Thus, d1  2d2=(1  d2) is the parameter constraint in this scenario.
It is easy to see that the optimal full information price 2
3+d1
and the maximum expected
revenue 1
3+d1
in this scenario are greater than or equal to those values in the situation where
there is only the REG channel i.e. 1=2 and 1=4 respectively, since we have the following:
P 1 =
2
3 + d1
>
2
3 + 1
=
1
2
; and  =
1
3 + d1
>
1
3 + 1
=
1
4
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